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Abstract: In 1902, Albert Moll, who at that time ran a private
practice for nervous diseases in Berlin, published his comprehensive
book on medical ethics,  Arztliche Ethik. Based on the concept of a
contractual relationship between doctor and client, it gave more room to
the self-determination of patients than the contemporary, usually rather
paternalistic, works of this genre. In the ﬁrst part of the present paper
this is illustrated by examining Moll’s views and advice on matters such
as truthfulness towards patients, euthanasia, and abortion. The second
part of this article discusses how Moll engaged with the then publicly
debated issues of experimentation on hospital patients and the ‘trade’
of foreign private patients between agents and medical consultants. In
both matters Moll collected evidence of unethical practices and tried
to use it to bring about change without damaging his or the profession’s
reputation.However,withhistacticalmanoeuvres,Mollmadenofriends
for himself among his colleagues or the authorities; his book on ethics
also met with a generally cool response from the medical profession and
seems to have been more appreciated by lawyers than by other doctors.
Keywords: Medical Ethics, Albert Moll, Truth-telling, Euthanasia,
Abortion, Human Experimentation
Introduction
In 1902, Albert Moll published his comprehensive, 650-page book  Arztliche Ethik: Die
Pflichten des Arztes in allen Beziehungen seiner Th atigkeit [Medical Ethics: The Doctor's
Duties in All Relations of His Work].1 At this time, Moll was already well known as a
medical author: his 1889 book on hypnotism and his 1891 monograph on homosexuality
had gone through several editions and translations, and his studies of the Libido sexualis
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1 Albert Moll,  Arztliche Ethik: Die Pflichten des Arztes in allen Beziehungen seiner Th atigkeit (Stuttgart:
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had come out in 1897/8.2 With his work on medical ethics he contributed to a literary
genre that had been ﬂourishing at the end of the nineteenth century. Books on medical
deontology – that is, on doctors’ professional duties – had been authored in the 1890s
by the Berlin physician and historian of medicine Julius Pagel (1851–1912), the Berlin
medical practitioner Jacob Wolff, the Bremen psychiatrist Friedrich Scholz (1831–1907)
and others.3 The common context for all of them was the so-called overcrowding of the
medical profession in those years. The resulting competition among practitioners was
accentuated by the increasing role of health insurance. Doctors not only competed for
lucrative private patients, but also for contracts with the health insurance organisations
[Krankenkassen], which gave them access to the insured working class and lower-middle-
class patients.4 Books on the doctors’ duties were seen as one means to counteract
overly competitive behaviour among medical practitioners, and to emphasise a need
for collegiality and solidarity. Other means to safeguard professional conduct were the
disciplinary tribunals of the medical societies and doctors’ chambers [ Arztekammern].
In Prussia, such medical courts of honour [ arztliche Ehrengerichte], attached to the
regional doctors’ chambers, had been established by law in 1899. Moreover, many medical
societies had adopted professional codes of conduct that served as guidance for their
disciplinary committees.5 Accordingly, writing about medical ethics predominantly meant
discussing the requirements of fair conduct among practitioners and how to display
behaviour that would enhance the reputation of the profession in the eyes of the public.
Moll’s Medical Ethics contained much of this type of professional ethics, yet he took a
distinctive approach to medical ethics – an approach that was fuelled by his outrage about
abuses in clinical experimentation on hospital patients. One of the most notorious cases,
which had recently been discussed in the daily press, was that of Dr Alexander Strubell,
2 Albert Moll, Der Hypnotismus (Berlin: Fischer’s medicinische Buchhandlung H. Kornfeld, 1889) (2nd edn,
ibid., 1890; 3rd edn, ibid., 1895; Engl. transl. New York: Scribner & Welford, 1890; London: Walter Scott,
1891; ibid., 1900; ibid., 1901); Albert Moll, Die contr are Sexualempfindung (Berlin: Fischer’s medicinische
Buchhandlung H. Kornfeld, 1891) (2nd edn, ibid., 1893; 3rd edn, ibid., 1899; French transl. Paris, G. Carr´ e,
1893; Spanish transl. Madrid, Fortanet, 1896; Italian transl. Rome, 1897); Albert Moll, Untersuchungen  uber die
Libido sexualis, Vol. 1, parts 1 and 2 (Berlin: Fischer’s medicinische Buchhandlung H. Kornfeld, 1897–8). On
the last work see the contribution by Sauerteig in this issue.
3 Julius Pagel, Medicinische Deontologie: Ein kleiner Katechismus f ur angehende Praktiker (Berlin: Oscar
Coblentz, 1897); Jacob Wolff, Der Praktische Arzt und sein Beruf: Vademecum f ur angehende Praktiker
(Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1896); Friedrich Scholz, Von  Arzten und Patienten: Lustige und unlustige
Plaudereien [1st edn 1899], 4th edn (Munich: Verlag der ¨ Arztlichen Rundschau Otto Gmelin, 1914). For
discussions of this genre see Andreas-Holger Maehle, Doctors, Honour and the Law: Medical Ethics in Imperial
Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 95–121; Georg Schomerus, Ein Ideal und sein Nutzen:
 Arztliche Ethik in England und Deutschland 1902{1933 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2001).
4 See Claudia Huerkamp, Der Aufstieg der  Arzte im 19. Jahrhundert: Vom gelehrten Stand zum
professionellen Experten: Das Beispiel Preuens (G¨ ottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985); Hedwig
Herold-Schmidt, ‘¨ Arztliche Interessenvertretung im Kaiserreich 1871–1914’, in Robert J¨ utte (ed.), Geschichte
der deutschen  Arzteschaft: Organisierte Berufs- und Gesundheitspolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert
(Cologne: Deutscher ¨ Arzte-Verlag, 1997), 43–95; Ingo Tamm,  Arzte und gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
in Deutschland und England 1880{1914 (Berlin: Verlag f¨ ur Wissenschafts- und Regionalgeschichte
Dr Michael Engel, 1998); Lutz Sauerteig, ‘Health Costs and the Ethics of the German Sickness
Insurance System’, in Andreas-Holger Maehle and Johanna Geyer-Kordesch (eds), Historical and
Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics: From Paternalism to Autonomy? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002),
49–72.
5 See Andreas-Holger Maehle ‘Professional Ethics and Discipline: The Prussian Medical Courts of Honour,
1899–1920’, Medizinhistorisches Journal, 34 (1999), 309–38; Maehle, op. cit. (note 3), 6–46; Barbara Rabi,
 Arztliche Ethik { Eine Frage der Ehre? Die Prozesse und Urteile der  arztlichen Ehrengerichte in Preuen und
Sachsen 1918{1933 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2002).God's Ethicist 219
who had locked up a patient with diabetes insipidus in an attic of the Jena university
clinics without any access to water in order to try to break the patient’s ‘habit’ of increased
drinking (polydipsia) and excessive urination (polyuria). The experiment was conceived
in analogy to withdrawal treatments for drug addicts. Allegedly, the patient became so
desperately thirsty that he ended up drinking his own urine.6 Another widely debated case
was that of the Breslau professor of dermatology Albert Neisser (1855–1916), who had
injected, without consent, eight female hospital patients, some of them minors and some
of them prostitutes, with blood serum from syphilis patients in the hope of developing
a vaccination for the disease. None of these patients suffered from syphilis at the time
of the experiment (1892); they had been hospitalised because of other skin or venereal
diseases. Four of the subjects, all of them prostitutes, developed syphilis some years later,
which raised the question of whether the infection had been caused by the experimental
injections or through their occupation.7 Moll was particularly upset about the many
bacteriological experiments that were carried out on hospital patients around this time,
including inoculation of dying patients with the germs of gonorrhoea and other infectious
diseases.8
Against this background, Moll advocated a medical ethics that focused on the doctor’s
relationship and duties to his patients, not just his professional obligations to medical
colleagues. In this article, I will ﬁrst outline Moll’s patient-centred type of ethics
and illustrate it with some moral issues that he regarded as more important than
professional etiquette: truth-telling and the justiﬁability of deceiving patients; the question
of euthanasia; and the so-called perforation of the fetus – ie. late abortion – when a natural
birthturnedouttobeimpossible.Thiswillprovidesomeinsightsintohistheoryofmedical
ethics. I will complement these in the second part of the paper with two cases of Moll’s
personal involvement in publicly debated ethical issues: the above-mentioned issue of
human experimentation in hospitals; and the so-called ‘patient trade’ scandal of 1908/9, in
which four professors of the Berlin university clinics were accused of paying middlemen
to bring them lucrative private patients. In the ﬁnal sections, I will assess the impact of
Moll’s ethics and his contemporary image as a ‘guardian of medical ethics’.
Characteristics of Moll's Medical Ethics
In writing Medical Ethics, Moll had received advice from two philosophers: his friend
Max Dessoir (1867–1947), with whom he also collaborated in the Berlin Society for
Experimental Psychology on questions of hypnotism and psychical research; and Georg
Simmel (1858–1918), who had been appointed to an extraordinary professorship at Berlin
University in 1901.9 Their input may, to some extent, explain why Moll started his
6 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 268, 525; Barbara Elkeles, Der moralische Diskurs  uber das medizinische
Menschenexperiment im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1996), 195–6; Barbara Elkeles,
‘Wissenschaft, Medizinethik und gesellschaftliches Umfeld: Die Diskussion um den Heilversuch um 1900’,
in Andreas Frewer and Josef N. Neumann (eds), Medizingeschichte und Medizinethik: Kontroversen und
Begr undungsans atze 1900{1950 (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2001), 21–43: 23–4.
7 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 24, 560–3; Barbara Elkeles, ‘Medizinische Menschenversuche gegen Ende des 19.
Jahrhunderts und der Fall Neisser’, Medizinhistorisches Journal, 20 (1985), 135–48. See also Elkeles, Diskurs,
op. cit. (note 6), 190–4; Elkeles, ‘Wissenschaft’, op. cit. (note 6), 24–5.
8 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 5, 9, 515, 538, 544, 546–8, 558, 569–70.
9 Ibid., vi. On the work of Moll, Dessoir and others in the Society for Experimental Psychology, see Albert
Moll, Ein Leben als Arzt der Seele: Erinnerungen (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1936), 128–42; Max Dessoir, Buch
der Erinnerung, 2nd edn (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1947); Adolf Kurzweg, ‘Die Geschichte der Berliner
“Gesellschaft f¨ ur Experimental-Psychologie” mit besonderer Ber¨ ucksichtigung ihrer Ausgangssituation und des220 Andreas-Holger Maehle
discussion of medical ethics by delineating its relationship to moral philosophy, an aspect
that one does not usually ﬁnd in other works of this genre at that time. Moll made it
clear that none of the current systems of moral philosophy could provide a basis for
medical ethics because one system of thought could be used to argue for entirely contrary
positions, thus failing to give reliable guidance for the doctor. Instead, Moll appealed to an
‘average morality’ [Durchschnittsmoral] of the people, a kind of intuitive common-sense
ethics in contemporary society, that the doctor shared with the layperson. This did not
mean, however, as Moll cautioned, that the doctor’s ethical decisions were determined by
public opinion.10 With his critical stance towards moral theories, Moll echoed positions
of Simmel, who in his Introduction to Ethics (1892) had argued that ethics had to be
developed into an inductive science in order to progress, and that this task was separate
from the normative role of ethics.11
Moreover, asMoll stressed, moralsystems such asevolutionary ethics andutilitarianism
could lead to conclusions that negated the role of the doctor as a healer. For instance, from
an evolutionary standpoint, it might be argued that patients with hereditary illnesses or
disabilities should not be treated in order not to be helped to pass on their condition to the
next generation, that is, a Social Darwinist and eugenic position might be supported. Or
from a utilitarian perspective, experimentation on a dying patient might be justiﬁed in the
interest of developing treatment for future patients. None of these conclusions appeared
acceptable to Moll, who asserted that the essential characteristic of the doctor was that of
the healer who is committed to the well-being of the individual patient.12
While this principle of Salus aegroti suprema lex was common among medical
authors writing on ethics,13 Moll gave it a characteristic, quasi-legal shape. For him, the
doctor–patient relationship was a (tacit) contract, with duties and rights for both parties.
This contract relationship implied full commitment of the doctor to his patient once he had
agreed to take on the treatment, though it also gave a right to the doctor to refuse treatment
in the ﬁrst place – except in emergencies. It also gave room for the self-determination of
the patient in questions of his or her health, but simultaneously implied an expectation of
compliance by the patient with the agreed treatment, at least as far as the patient’s personal
circumstances permitted it.14
This basic concept ran through the whole of Moll’s work on medical ethics, giving
it some coherence, despite a strong tendency towards long-winded and overly detailed
discussion and excessive casuistry. These latter problems were also observed by reviewers
Wirkens von Max Dessoir’ (unpublished MD thesis: Freie Universit¨ at Berlin, 1976). For an introduction to
Simmel’s work see David Frisby, Georg Simmel (London: Routledge, 2002).
10 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 10–16, 21–2, 247.
11 Georg Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft: Eine Kritik der ethischen Grundbegriffe, 2 vols, Vol. 1,
iii–v; Vol. 2, iii–vi (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1892).
12 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 7–9, 55.
13 For example Pagel, op. cit. (note 3), 45; Albert Krecke, The Doctor and his Patients, Margaret M. Green
(trans.) (London: Kegan Paul, 1934), 79.
14 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 14, 33–54. See also Albert Moll, ‘Aufs¨ atze zu einer medicinischen Ethik’, Deutsche
Medicinische Wochenschrift, 25 (1899), 462–4; and 26 (1900), 73–5. The importance of the contract relationship
in Moll’s medical ethics has likewise been emphasised by Julius Henri Schultz, AlbertMolls  ArztlicheEthik (MD
thesis: Zurich: Juris-Verlag, 1986). See also Antonia K. Eben, Medizinische Ethik im weltanschaulich-religi osen
Kontext: Albert Moll und Albert Niedermeyer im Vergleich (MD thesis: Munich, 1998), 92; Dorothea Cario,
‘Albert Moll (1862–1939). Leben, Werk und Bedeutung f¨ ur die medizinische Psychologie’ (unpublished MD
thesis: University of Mainz, 1999), 50–65, 94–9.God's Ethicist 221
and probably limited the book’s success.15 While two Russian editions of Medical Ethics
appeared in 1903 and 1904,16 there was no further German edition – a marked contrast
to the success of Moll’s books on hypnosis and on sexology. Perhaps over-ambitious
in its comprehensiveness, Moll’s Medical Ethics not only covered the doctor–patient
relationship, or as Moll called it, the relations between ‘doctor and client’, but discussed
in detail the various forms of practice, as a house doctor, specialist, panel doctor, hospital
doctor, country doctor, etc.; dangerous or morally problematic actions of the doctor,
such as abortion or risky surgical interventions; economic aspects of medical practice,
including the health insurance system; the doctor’s professional and private conduct; the
role of public and personal hygiene; the doctor as an expert for the authorities, courts and
insurance organisations; the ethics of medical science and research on animal and human
subjects; and ﬁnally, questions of medical education. This scope was not dissimilar to
Pagel’s book on doctors’ duties; the latter, however, had managed to limit his Ein kleiner
Katechismus f ur angehende Praktiker [A Brief Catechism for Incoming Practitioners], as
he subtitled it, to a mere ninety-seven pages. Pagel covered, in his text, the setting up
and running of a medical practice; the doctor’s conduct in society, towards patients and
colleagues, including behaviour during consultations; medical societies and professional
discipline; the relationships to pharmacists, midwives and other healers; town and country
practice, as well as the roles of poor law physician, panel doctor and ofﬁcer of health;
and the doctor’s fees and book-keeping. Unlike Moll’s approach to the doctor–patient
relationship, Pagel’s was overtly paternalistic: the doctor had to be, or at least appear to
be, ‘sovereign’ in the interests of the sick. This view was in line with that of many other
medical practitioners of his generation.17 In the following sections, I will illustrate Moll’s
particular ethical argumentation with the examples of deceiving patients, euthanasia and
abortion.
Truth-telling and Deception
Moll was aware of philosophical positions such as those of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), who had both argued that truthfulness was an
unconditional duty in any situation,18 but he rejected this point of view as unsuitable
for the demands of medical practice. According to Moll, the doctor had to distinguish
whether he had only been asked for his expert opinion on a medical question, or whether
he was also in charge of the patient’s care. In the former case, the contract relationship
15 Gustav Aschaffenburg, ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Zeitschrift f ur Socialwissenschaft, 5 (1902), 751–2;
Leopold Henius, ‘Albert Moll, ¨ Arztliche Ethik’, Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, 28 (1902), 528–9; Karl
Jaff´ e, ‘Albert Moll, ¨ Arztliche Ethik’, M unchener Medicinische Wochenschrift, 49 (1902), 287; Kaminer, ‘Albert
Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Deutsche Aerzte-Zeitung, 5 (1903), 11; Korn, ‘Albert Moll, Die Pﬂichten des Arztes
in allen Beziehungen seiner Th¨ atigkeit’, Die  arztliche Praxis, 15, 10 (1902), 152–3; R., ‘Albert Moll, ¨ Arztliche
Ethik’, Deutsche Medizinal-Zeitung, 23 (1902), 121–5.
16 See Boleslav L. Lichterman and Mikhail Yarovinsky, ‘The Discourses of Practitioners in Eighteenth
to Twentieth Century Russia and Soviet Union’, in Robert B. Baker and Laurence B. McCullough
(eds), The Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
439–45: 443.
17 Pagel, op. cit. (note 3), esp. 41–2. On other deontological literature of this type, see Maehle, op. cit. (note 3),
95–109.
18 See Immanuel Kant, ‘On a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives’, in Immanuel Kant, Critique
of Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral Philosophy, Lewis White Beck (ed. and trans.) (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949), 346–50; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The System of Ethics, D. Breazeale and
G¨ unter Z¨ oller (eds and trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 269–78.222 Andreas-Holger Maehle
obliged the doctor to give the patient his truthful opinion. An exception could only be
made if the prognosis was so dire that suicide of the patient had to be feared. In the second
scenario, when the doctor had taken on a mandate for the patient’s care, the decision about
truthfulness or deception depended on the best interests of the patient. Here, deception
could be permissible; for example, a patient with hysteric paralysis who had put hope in a
course of magneto-therapy should be encouraged by the doctor in order to make use of the
suggestive effect of such a harmless treatment. In dangerous diseases, deceiving patients
in their own interest could also be acceptable. This might also extend to misleading
the relatives of the patient, who might otherwise reveal the seriousness of the condition
through their words or behaviour.19
In this context, Moll addressed particularly the question of truth-telling in incurably ill
patients. Tactful disclosure of the dire prognosis seemed justiﬁed in the patient’s interest,
if the patient had to sort out his or her personal affairs – eg. by drawing up a last will
– or if the patient was religious (Catholic) and would want to be given the last rites. If
the doctor had merely been asked for his expert opinion, disclosure of the prognosis was
rather unproblematic in these two situations. If, however, the doctor was also responsible
for the patient’s treatment, and perhaps, as the house doctor, for the health of the patient’s
family, he carefully had to weigh the potential damage caused by telling the truth against
the potential beneﬁts. Moll advised the doctor in this case to involve a third person to
communicate the bad prognosis, which would affect the patient’s psychological condition
less and would keep the doctor in his role as a source of hope and support.20 Moll’s
discussion of the problem of truth-telling thus gave careful attention to what the speciﬁc
contract with the patient – and his/her family – implied. The demands of the contract
eventually determined the ethical decision. With his application of his contract theory,
Moll’s position on truth-telling became differentiated and explicit.
It was not, however, radically different from the traditional medical view in this matter,
which likewise permitted restrictions on truthfulness vis- a-vis the terminally ill. Prominent
nineteenth-century medical authors, such as Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland (1762–1836)
and Karl Friedrich Heinrich Marx (1796–1877), had warned that telling the truth in this
situation might seriously harm, even ‘kill’, the patient.21 This silence of the doctors could,
as Karen Nolte has recently shown, conﬂict with the intentions of nurses belonging to
religious orders, who wished to inform incurably ill patients about their imminent end, so
thattheycouldbespirituallypreparedfordeath.22 Typicaloftheattitudeofdoctorswasthe
advice given by the Viennese surgeon Robert Gersuny (1844–1924) in his deontological
booklet Arzt und Patient: Winke f ur Beide [Doctor and Patient: Hints for Both] (1884)
to be very restrictive in giving information to patients with serious illnesses. Diagnoses
such as tuberculosis and cancer should, in his view, not be mentioned because they would
deprive the patient of hope. The doctor should even exercise caution in speaking with
the relatives in such cases, because they might pass the information on to the patient or
19 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 210–20.
20 Ibid., 121–7.
21 Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland, ‘Die Verh¨ altnisse des Arztes’, Journal der practischen Heilkunde, 23, 3 (1806),
5–36: 17; Karl Friedrich Heinrich Marx,  ArztlicherKatechismus:  UberdieAnforderungenandie  Arzte (Stuttgart:
Ferdinand Enke, 1876), 33–4.
22 Karen Nolte, ‘Telling the Painful Truth – Nurses and Physicians in the Nineteenth Century’, Nursing History
Review, 16 (2008), 115–34.God's Ethicist 223
become unable to be carers as a result of their own sense of hopelessness.23 Similarly, the
Munich surgeon Albert Krecke (1863–1932) claimed that a ‘cancer patient gains nothing
by knowing the nature of his malady. A doctor acts in obedience to the highest dictates
of humanity if he conceals the true nature of the complaint from his patient, whilst at
the same time endeavouring to effect a radical cure of the gruesome disease’.24 In his
memoirs, published in 1936, Moll portrayed his position as one of absolute truthfulness
towards his patients 25 – a claim that clearly contradicted the advice that he had given in
his Medical Ethics.
Euthanasia
Within his discussion of the doctor–patient relationship, Moll also addressed the
then controversially discussed question of euthanasia. From the perspective of Social
Darwinism, racial hygiene and eugenics, the Berlin physician Alfred Ploetz (1860–1940)
hadpropagated,in1895,hisvisionofasocietythatwouldpractiseactiveeuthanasia–with
morphine – of weak and disabled newborns, and that would refrain from caring for the
sick, the blind and the deaf-mute in order to avoid counteracting natural selection.26 A few
years earlier, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), in his G otzend ammerung
[Twilight of the Idols] – written in 1888 – had denounced the sick as ‘parasites on society’,
who – from a certain stage of illness that made them entirely dependent on doctors and
other practitioners – should be treated with social contempt. Doctors, he suggested, should
then be ‘the agents of this contempt – not offering prescriptions, but instead a daily dose
of disgust at their patients’.27 Also in 1895, the notorious booklet Das Recht auf den Tod
[The Right to Death] by Adolf Jost had been published. Jost, a student of philosophy,
mathematics and physics at the University of G¨ ottingen, argued here that in some cases
of incurable physical or mental illness, death was desirable both from the patient’s and
from society’s perspective. Taking a utilitarian approach, he claimed that the intensity
of the individual’s suffering and the amount of harm caused to society by the patient’s
sickness could result in a ‘negative value of the human life’. Since killing on demand was
punishable with not less than three years’ imprisonment under the German Penal Code of
1871 (Section 216), Jost called for legal reform. A new law would permit, in such cases,
voluntary active euthanasia performed by physicians. Once this had been established in
society, a further step of legal reform might extend also to euthanasia, without consent, of
incurably ill mental patients.28
Moll ﬁrmly rejected such ideas in his medical ethics. For him, any measures that
deliberately shortened a patient’s life were inadmissible – from the point of view of
23 Robert Gersuny, Arzt und Patient: Winke f ur Beide (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1884), 18–22.
24 Krecke, op. cit. (note 13), 87.
25 Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 266–9.
26 Alfred Ploetz, Die T uchtigkeit unsrer Rasse und der Schutz der Schwachen: Ein Versuch  uber Rassenhygiene
und ihr Verh altnis zu den humanen Idealen, besonders zum Socialismus (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1895), 144, 147;
Udo Benzenh¨ ofer, Der gute Tod? Euthanasie und Sterbehilfe in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: C.H.
Beck, 1999), 84–8. On Ploetz and his concept of racial hygiene see Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German
Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 1870{1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer’, in Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and other Writings, Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (eds),
Judith Norman (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 153–229: 209–10.
28 Adolf Jost, Das Recht auf den Tod: Sociale Studie (G¨ ottingen: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1895).
See also Benzenh¨ ofer, op. cit. (note 26), 93–5.224 Andreas-Holger Maehle
criminal law as well as of morality. Moll used here what we now call a ‘slippery slope
argument’: if one once admitted such a right to kill the terminally ill, it might also be
applied to shorten a patient’s life by months and even years, if a painful and socially
unproductive remaining lifespan was predicted. There would be no stopping. The doctor,
however, Moll asserted, had to prolong not shorten life. Life should be the doctor’s highest
good, and death should be seen by him as the worst evil.29 Moll’s argument here was a
classical piece of medical ethics, virtually the same as Hufeland had used at the beginning
of the nineteenth century.30 As Michael Stolberg has recently shown, however, there
were already individual cases of German medical practitioners performing active life-
shortening measures on terminally ill patients around 1800.31 Although Moll very rarely
made reference to Hippocratic ethics in his work, he pointed to the Hippocratic Oath’s
prohibition of giving a deadly poison to a patient, even on demand.32
Moll’s position on the question of euthanasia was in line with the prevailing view of the
medical profession at his time – at least on the level of normative writing and debate.33
Moll rejected traditional techniques of euthanasia, such as pulling away the pillow from
underneath the dying person’s head or turning the patient on their face. He did, however,
concede a generous use of narcotics to mitigate pain, even if they led to unconsciousness.
The objection that inducing unconsciousness was incompatible with the dying person’s
dignity was, in his view, invalid. Moll was aware of the fact that high doses of painkillers,
such as morphine, could shorten the lifespan of the dying patient, but he regarded this as a
case of applying risky treatments, which were permissible according to his contract theory
with the patient’s consent.34 There was no clear sense in Moll’s discussion of this matter of
the problematic nature of so-called indirect or double-effect euthanasia. His understanding
of the concept of euthanasia was the traditional one, as part of palliative care. In fact, he
referred to the Berlin professor of clinical medicine Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813),
who had described in detail how good nursing care could ease a patient’s ﬁnal hours.35
Still, Moll’s contract theory also inﬂuenced his advice in this area. ‘Heroic’ treatment
efforts, such as strong electric stimulation, which would prolong the dying patient’s life for
just a short time and would only increase his or her pain, should not be undertaken, even if
the patient’s family urgently asked for them. The contract relationship, Moll emphasised,
was still with the dying patient, not with the relatives, so the presumed interest of the
patient in not suffering even more than necessary in their last moments was paramount.
Similarly, from his contract-perspective, Moll condemned medical experimentation on
dying patients as ethically entirely unacceptable and as a shameful act of brutality.36
29 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 127–9.
30 Hufeland, op. cit. (note 21), 14–6.
31 Michael Stolberg, ‘Two German Pioneers of Euthanasia around 1800’, Hastings Center Report, 38, 3 (2008),
19–22.
32 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 129.
33 Benzenh¨ ofer, op. cit. (note 26), 77.
34 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 129–31, 243.
35 Ibid., 129, 133; Johann Christian Reil, ‘Euthanasia, oder von den H¨ ulfen, ertr¨ aglich zu sterben’, in Johann
Christian Reil, Entwurf einer allgemeinen Therapie (Halle: Curtsche Buchhandlung, 1816), 560–82. On the
pre-modern understanding of palliative care see Michael Stolberg, ‘Cura palliativa: Begriff und Diskussion der
palliativen Krankheitsbehandlung in der vormodernen Medizin (ca. 1500–1850)’, Medizinhistorisches Journal,
42 (2007), 7–29.
36 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 131–3.God's Ethicist 225
Perforation of the Fetus
The self-determination of the patient or, if this could no longer be exercised, the patient’s
presumed interest, likewise guided Moll’s advice in another morally contested issue, the
practice of craniotomy or ‘perforation’ of the fetus when a natural delivery was impossible
– eg. because of too narrow a pelvis. The alternative, a Caesarean section, at that time still
carried a relatively high risk of mortality – about ten per cent – for the mother. Craniotomy
of the fetus, which inevitably killed it, was seen as a desperate measure for saving the
mother’s life, although around 1900 it had a similar mortality risk for the mother as a
Caesarean section. Legally, perforation of the fetus was regarded as permitted. Jurists
had argued, for example, that the killing of the fetus in this situation could be seen as
self-defence or as an act in a state of emergency.37 Moll, however, examined the issue
from an ethical point of view. If the woman requested the perforation, the doctor had to
follow her wish and carry out the procedure. Also, if the woman was unable to express
her will due to her condition, or left the decision to the doctor, the craniotomy should
be performed. For Moll, the fetus was not an independent human being, which meant
that its life could not be balanced against the life of the mother. If, however, the mother
deliberately wanted to take the risk of a Caesarean section, the doctor should also follow
her wishes, because self-sacriﬁce for a high purpose was regarded as ethically permissible.
If the mother was dying and unconscious, the Caesarean section could also be performed,
because the mother’s consent to an attempt to save the baby’s life could be presumed.38
Moll’semphasisonthewishesofthemothercontrastedwiththatofleadinggynaecologists
and obstetricians of the time, such as Bernhard Kr¨ onig (1863–1917) in Freiburg, who
wanted to make the decision only on medical grounds, which could mean that a Caesarean
section was performed against the mother’s will.39
Moll’s position on the question of the perforation of the fetus also matched his rather
liberal views on the morality of earlier abortions. The German Penal Code, which at the
time punished abortion with imprisonment or penal servitude for up to ﬁve years (Section
218), was, in his opinion, out of tune with public sentiment. The public did not invariably
regard abortion as something unethical, as Moll pointed out, especially not if carried out in
an early stage of pregnancy.40 In fact, it has been estimated that in late nineteenth-century
Germany, between three hundred thousand and ﬁve hundred thousand abortions were
performed every year.41 Only a small proportion of these cases, less than one thousand
per year around the turn of the century (1882–1912), ended with a criminal conviction.42
Moll himself was sympathetic to women who wanted to terminate a pregnancy after rape
or if they already had too many children to support. He was also not alone in his view
that a doctor should not denounce the woman to the police, if he was called to attend to
37 Ibid., 249–50; Joseph Heimberger, Strafrecht und Medizin (Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1899), 64–5; Barbara Elkeles, ‘Die schweigsame Welt von Arzt und Patient: Einwilligung und Aufkl¨ arung in der
Arzt-Patienten-Beziehung des 19. und fr¨ uhen 20. Jahrhunderts’, Medizin, Gesellschaft und Geschichte, 8 (1989),
63–91: 76–83.
38 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 250–9.
39 Elkeles, op. cit. (note 37), 81–3.
40 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 259. For the debate on abortion law reform in Imperial and Weimar Germany, see
Cornelie Usborne, The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany: Women's Reproductive Rights and Duties
(London: Macmillan, 1992); Cornelie Usborne, Cultures of Abortion in Weimar Germany (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2007).
41 Eduard Seidler, ‘Das 19. Jahrhundert. Zur Vorgeschichte des Paragraphen 218’, in Robert J¨ utte (ed.),
Geschichte der Abtreibung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1993), 120–39: 135.
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complications after a botched abortion. The harm done to the doctor–patient relationship
through a breach of medical conﬁdentiality in this situation, and the serious damage to
the woman’s reputation, had to be weighed against the value of reporting a crime.43 In
1911, Moll commented on a case in which a doctor had reported the woman concerned,
with her consent, in order to initiate prosecution of the abortionist. Both the abortionist
and the woman had subsequently been convicted, but the latter had been able to submit
a plea for clemency which was supported by the public prosecutor. In Moll’s view, a
case like this was a matter of personal, conscientious decision-making for the doctor.44
Many doctors, it seems, did not report abortions. Moll’s views on medical conﬁdentiality
were differentiated. While he leaned towards protecting patients’ conﬁdence on the issue
of abortion, in 1905, he successfully supported the defence of a Berlin doctor who was
accused of a breach of professional secrecy – under Section 300 of the German Penal
Code – for having warned the relatives of a syphilitic patient of the danger of infection.45
We can conclude from Moll’s argumentation in the three examined ethical issues of
truth-telling, euthanasia and abortion that the self-determination of the patient was a
central factor. It competed, to some extent, with the best interest of the patient – especially
in the case of truth-telling – but unlike other writers on medical ethics at the time, such
as Pagel and Scholz, Moll was not a paternalist.46 His quasi-legal understanding of the
doctor–patient relationship committed him to the well-being and interests of the individual
patient, and this included respect for the patient’s wishes. In this sense, Moll’s theory of
medical ethics might be seen as a forerunner of the modern concept of patient autonomy,
although his practical conclusions were rather moderate and often in line with medical
traditions. The patient’s consent to treatment, after adequate information and advice, was a
crucial element in Moll’s ethics.47 This goes some way to explain his position and actions
on the issue of clinical experimentation on hospital patients, to which I will turn in the
following sections.
Human Experimentation
In his Medical Ethics, Moll provided a summary of about 600 research papers that
explicitly or implicitly reported non-therapeutic experimental interventions on human
subjects. He had collected these publications from the international literature, as he
emphasised: from Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy, England, Russia, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Romania, the United States, Chile and Egypt. Many of the examples
that Moll cited indicated that patients had been harmed, or at least molested or exposed to
risks, through experimentation. Moreover, in many cases, the human subjects did not seem
to have been informed about the nature and implications of the experiment, nor been asked
43 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 105–6, 259–60.
44 Albert Moll, ‘Neuere Fragen zum ¨ arztlichen Berufsgeheimnis’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 16 (1911),
1–4.
45 Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 270–1; Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 38 (1905), 62–6 (II.
Strafsenat, Urteil vom 16. Mai 1905). On the contemporary medico-legal debate on medical conﬁdentiality,
including the question of reporting on abortions, see Andreas-Holger Maehle, ‘Protecting Patient Privacy
or Serving Public Interests? Challenges to Medical Conﬁdentiality in Imperial Germany’, Social History of
Medicine, 16 (2003), 383–401. See also Maehle, op. cit. (note 3), 47–68.
46 For a discussion of Scholz and Pagel in this respect, see Maehle, ibid., 84–7. See also Andreas-Holger Maehle,
‘Zwischen medizinischem Paternalismus und Patientenautonomie: Albert Moll’s “¨ Arztliche Ethik” (1902) im
historischen Kontext’, in Frewer and Neumannn, op. cit. (note 6), 44–56.
47 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 263, 564–5.God's Ethicist 227
for their consent to being a subject in a trial. Typically, the experiments had been carried
out on hospital patients or other institutionalised persons, such as orphans or prisoners.48
While Moll’s tone in his medical ethics was generally neutral and considered, his outrage
about abuses in human experimentation became clearly recognisable at this point:
I have observed with increasing surprise that some medics, obsessed by a kind of research mania, have
ignored the areas of law and morality in a most problematic manner. For them, the freedom of research
goes so far that it destroys any consideration for others. The borderline between human beings and animals
is blurred for them. The unfortunate sick person who has entrusted herself to their treatment is shamefully
betrayed by them, her trust is betrayed, and the human being is degraded to a guinea pig. Some of these
cases have occurred in clinics whose directors cannot talk enough about ‘humanitarianism’, so that they
mayalmostberegardedasspecialistsinhumanitarianism.Thereseemtobenonationalorpoliticalborders
for this aberration.49
Despite its international dimension, the problem was of particular relevance to Prussia.
Alerted by the scandal surrounding the syphilis experiments of Albert Neisser, which were
discussed in the Prussian Parliament, the Prussian Minister for Religious, Educational and
Medical Affairs [Minister der geistlichen, Unterrichts- und Medizinal-Angelegenheiten]
had commissioned, in March 1899, an expert report on human experimentation from
the Ministry’s Scientiﬁc Committee for Medicine [Wissenschaftliche Deputation f ur das
Medizinalwesen]. Neisser himself, as a university professor, was punished – with a
reprimand and a ﬁne – by the Royal Disciplinary Court for Civil Servants [K oniglicher
Disziplinarhof f ur nicht-richterliche Beamte] because he had failed to obtain consent from
the parents or guardians of the minors on whom he had experimented. The syphilis serum
injections given to those of his subjects who were prostitutes were, however, regarded by
the court as legitimate therapeutic trials, because they might have protected the subjects
against the risk of catching syphilis through their occupation. As a kind of immunisation
therapy for prostitutes, who could legally be subjected to compulsory medical treatment,
these trials did not require consent.50
This distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic trials was central in a directive
that the Prussian Minister issued to the directors of hospitals and clinics on 29 December
1900. It required information about the risks and consent of the subjects in scientiﬁc,
non-therapeutic trials, but did not make this a requirement for interventions that served
‘therapeutic, diagnostic or immunisation purposes’. Moreover, the directive made the
hospital or clinic directors personally responsible for the scientiﬁc trials, which had to
be documented – including the compliance with information and consent requirements
48 Ibid., 504–52.
49 This and all subsequent translations, unless otherwise stated, are the author’s own. Cf. ibid., 504–5:
‘...ich habe dabei mit stets wachsendem Erstaunen wahrgenommmen, dass sich einzelne Mediziner, von
einer Art Forschungsmanie besessen, ¨ uber die Gebiete des Rechts und der Sittlichkeit in bedenklichster Weise
hinwegsetzen. F¨ ur sie geht die Freiheit der Forschung so weit, dass sie jede R¨ ucksicht auf andere durchbricht. Die
Grenze zwischen Mensch und Tier ist f¨ ur sie verwischt. Der ungl¨ uckliche Kranke, der sich ihnen zur Behandlung
anvertraut hat, wird von ihnen schm¨ ahlich betrogen, das Vertrauen get¨ auscht, und der Mensch wird zum
Versuchskaninchen degradiert. Einige dieser F¨ alle sind in Kliniken vorgekommen, deren Leiter nicht oft genug
das Wort Humanit¨ at im Munde f¨ uhren k¨ onnen, so dass man sie fast als Spezialisten f¨ ur Humanit¨ at betrachten
k¨ onnte. Nationale und politische Grenzen scheint diese Verirrung nicht zu kennen’; Moll also mentioned his
indignation at human experiments in his memoirs as the immediate reason for writing his book on medical
ethics. See Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 261–3.
50 Elkeles, Diskurs, op. cit. (note 6), 192–3, 204–6; Elkeles, ‘Wissenschaft’, op. cit. (note 6), 24–5.228 Andreas-Holger Maehle
– in the patients’ ﬁles. Non-therapeutic experiments on minors and other persons lacking
full legal competence were forbidden.51
Moll criticised these regulations in Medical Ethics, arguing that on the one hand they
did not provide enough protection for the human subjects, and that on the other, they went
too far in their requirements. They went too far in ruling out scientiﬁc experiments on
minors; for example, taking a blood sample from a twenty-year-old within a scientiﬁc
study would not be allowed in Prussia. But the regulations were not stringent enough, as
they did not make clear whether the ‘therapeutic, diagnostic or immunisation purposes’
referred to the individual patient or to all interventions of this type, regardless of whether
they might be useful to the individual subject concerned. Moll also doubted that simple
recording in the patient’s ﬁle was sufﬁcient to ensure that full information had been given
and valid consent obtained. He was aware of the authoritarian milieu in the hospitals and
university clinics of the time, in which the mostly lower-class patients were expected to
follow doctors’ orders. Many patients would also lack the education to fully comprehend
the implications of a proposed trial. Moll therefore demanded a guarantor for the proper
information and consent of the subjects, and written consent for serious interventions.52
Beyond this critique in his book on medical ethics, Moll became personally involved in
the issue. With the exception of the cases that were well known through the press, such as
those of Neisser and Strubell, Moll deliberately omitted the names of the experimenters
in his account of problematic human trials in Medical Ethics. In a preceding article on
the issue of human experimentation, published in November 1899 in the critical political
weekly Die Zukunft, he had likewise abstained from giving names. His aim was to draw
attention to abuses in clinical trials as a general problem, not to individual researchers such
as Neisser.53
After publication of this article, however, Moll was approached by Friedrich Althoff
(1839–1908), the inﬂuential Ministerial Director in the Prussian Ministry for Religious,
Educational and Medical Affairs, who requested to see Moll’s material on this topic.54
The request was sent on 30 December 1900, just one day after the Minister’s directive
on scientiﬁc trials had been issued. Obviously, the Ministry planned investigations, and
possibly disciplinary proceedings, against some of the researchers who were resident in
Prussia. In early January 1901, Moll replied to Althoff’s letter, stating that he was willing
to give access to his material under two conditions: that it was explicitly acknowledged by
the Ministry that he, Moll, had supplied the information upon Althoff’s request; and that
he was given an assurance that his material was not going to be used in investigations of
individual persons. Moll explained his conditions with his wish to avoid any resemblance
with anonymous denunciation. Rather, he wanted his material to provide background
information for the drawing up of future regulations on human trials.55 As can be gathered
51 ‘AnweisungandieVorsteherderKliniken,PoliklinikenundsonstigenKrankenanstalten’(29December1900),
Zentralblatt f ur die gesamte Unterrichtsverwaltung in Preuen (1901), 188–9; reprinted in Elkeles, Diskurs, op.
cit. (note 6), 209; see also Lutz Sauerteig, ‘Ethische Richtlinien, Patientenrechte und ¨ arztliches Verhalten bei der
Arzneimittelerprobung (1892–1931)’, Medizinhistorisches Journal, 35 (2000), 303–34.
52 Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 564–8.
53 Albert Moll, ‘Versuche am lebenden Menschen’, Die Zukunft, 9, 15 (1899), 213–8; Moll, op. cit. (note 1), 24,
562; Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 263. The editor of Die Zukunft was the inﬂuential Jewish-born publicist and critic of
Wilhelmian government, Maximilian Harden (1861–1927).
54 Letter from Althoff to Moll, 30 December 1900, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (hereafter
GStA PK), I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 1, Tit. X, Nr. 47, Bd. 1, fol. 466.
55 Letter from Moll to Althoff, 7 January 1901, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 1, Tit. X, Nr. 47, Bd. 2, fol.
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from a memorandum of the ministerial ofﬁcial Ludwig Elster (1856–1935) at the end of
February 1901, Moll was subsequently told that the assurance mentioned in his second
condition could not ofﬁcially be granted. Moll then continued to refuse permission for
access to his material, but agreed that the ministerial ofﬁcial could meet with him privately
to look into his documentation, provided he was given the requested assurance by this
ofﬁcial. After Elster had given Moll the assurance, he was able to study the material, a
total of ninety-ﬁve cases, and to take notes. As Elster remarked, however, most cases were
‘totally harmless’.56 The Ministry does not seem to have taken much further action on the
issue of human experimentation in the following years. As Barbara Elkeles has found in
her research on this matter, only six cases were investigated by the Ministry between 1900
and 1913, but were not pursued any further due to ‘harmlessness’.57 When Moll described
the affair in his memoirs of 1936, he indicated that his reluctance to reveal the identity of
the experimenters had led to dissonances with the Ministry, and he associated these with
his failure to obtain an allegedly planned titular professorship at Berlin University.58
The incident had, in fact, drawn the Ministry’s attention to Moll as a person and
physician. After Moll had published, in March 1901, another critical article on the issue
of human experimentation, this time in the popular illustrated news magazine Die Woche,
Elster requested, on behalf of the Ministry, a report on Moll from the Berlin chief of police,
speciﬁcally on Moll’s personal circumstances and his standing in medical circles.59 The
report, authored by a medical civil servant in the police department, Richard Wehmer
(1854–1909), was highly ambivalent. On the one hand, it acknowledged that Moll’s
medical practice was ‘good’, that he lived unmarried in orderly and prosperous ﬁnancial
circumstances in his Berlin ﬂat, and that his recent scientiﬁc works had found recognition,
but on the other hand, it pointed out that Moll had specialised in hypnotism and had fallen
out with leading experts over scientiﬁc questions; that he had attacked the work of asylum
doctors in the journal Die Zukunft; and that he liked to study sexual perversions and had
served as an expert in trials against sexual offenders. The report even contained a piece of
innuendo, saying that detectives were often seen in his ﬂat, that prostitutes were among
his patients, and that there were rumours that something mysterious was going on at his
home. The account ended with the observation that Moll did not vote in the 1893 general
elections, and that he was a member of the Progressive Party [Fortschrittspartei], but that
he had never attracted the attention of the police through any political campaigning.60 The
report was ﬁled in the Ministry and no further action seems to have been taken.
The whole affair revealed a pattern in Moll’s behaviour: engagement in a public debate
on the ethics of medicine; conﬁdent and almost arrogant dealings with the authorities;
and yet also anxious concern for his reputation as well as the reputation of the medical
profession. Moll was aware of the broader implications of the contemporary debate on
56 Memorandum by Elster, 28 February 1901, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 1, Tit. X, Nr. 47, Bd. 2, fol.
172r.
57 Elkeles, ‘Menschenversuche’, op. cit. (note 7), 147–8.
58 Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 263–5.
59 Albert Moll, ‘Aerztliche Versuche am Menschen’, Die Woche, 9 March 1901. Letter from Elster and Kirchner
to Polizei-Pr¨ asident, 6 May 1901, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Tit. X, Nr. 47, Bd. 2, fol. 260.
60 Der Polizei-Pr¨ asident, Referent: Regierungs- und Medizinal-Rath Dr Wehmer, ‘Betrifft den Arzt Dr Albert
Moll zu Berlin’, 23 June 1901, ibid., fol. 277r–278v. Moll had criticised that directors of private mental asylums
might, for business reasons, be tempted to keep patients hospitalised for longer than medically necessary. He
therefore suggested nationalising the mental asylums. See Albert Moll, ‘Privatirrenanstalten’, Die Zukunft, 7
(1894), 550–8; Albert Moll, ‘Die Verstaatlichung der Irrenanstalten’, Die Zukunft, 10 (1895), 21–8. On Moll’s
role as an expert witness in trials of sex offenders, see the contribution by Conn in this issue.230 Andreas-Holger Maehle
human experiments, which included a general lay criticism of scientiﬁc medicine and
of medical authority, especially as practised in hospital.61 To the extent that mostly
working-class patients were the subjects of clinical experimentation, the issue had also
a political dimension. The case of Strubell, for example, had been made public by the
Social Democratic newspaper Vorw arts.62 Friedrich Scholz, in his widely read ethical
reﬂections Von Aerzten und Patienten [On Doctors and Patients] (ﬁrst published in 1899),
noted complaints about the autocratic attitude of some hospital physicians who regarded
the patients that were dependent on them as ‘material’ and ‘abused them for the sake of
science’. Syphilis inoculations, made out of scientiﬁc curiosity and with the knowledge
that they would do harm, were in his eyes ‘criminal’.63 Moreover, the public attacks
against Neisser had anti-Semitic undertones 64, something that Moll, who had converted
from Judaism to Protestantism in 1895, as the police report on him noted, is likely to
have felt. Julius Pagel, who, like Neisser, was Jewish, defended the latter’s controversial
human trials on syphilis immunisation by explaining their scientiﬁc context and medical
signiﬁcance.65 To a degree, Moll’s manoeuvring between going public and protecting
himself and the profession becomes understandable from a consideration of these various
contexts.
`Patient trade'
However, a similar behavioural pattern became apparent again a few years later when
Moll became involved in the so-called ‘patient trade’ affair of 1908/9.66 In October 1908,
the Medical Society of Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg [Verein der Sch oneberger Aerzte] began an
investigation of medical practitioners’ referrals of foreign private patients to specialist
consultants in Berlin hospitals and university clinics. The main target of this investigation
was the Russian Institute for Medical Consultations in Berlin [Russisches Institut f ur
medizinische Consultationen zu Berlin], run by doctors Semjon Lipliawsky (born c.1875)
and Siegfried Weissbein (born c.1877), who arranged, for a fee, consultations with
leading medical specialists for Russian patients visiting the German capital.67 There
were also other such ‘institutes’, as well as individual agents in Berlin, who provided
this service to foreign visitors. Allegedly, these middlemen were not only paid by the
patients but also by the clinicians consulted. For the medical practitioners of Sch¨ oneberg
this would constitute unfair competition for lucrative private patients. Through a series of
61 Moll, ‘Versuche’, op. cit. (note 53), 213, 218.
62 Elkeles, ‘Wissenschaft’, op. cit. (note 6), 24.
63 Scholz, op. cit. (note 3), 127.
64 See Elkeles, Diskurs, op. cit. (note 6), 170–9, 199–201.
65 Julius Pagel, ‘Ueber den Versuch am lebenden Menschen’, Deutsche Aerzte-Zeitung, no. 9 (1905), 193–8, and
no. 10 (1905), 219–28: 222–4, 226. Pagel had originally written this paper in August 1900 as part of a planned
memorandum from the Prussian Ministry for Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs in the context of the
Neisser case. The memorandum was, however, not published. See ibid., 193.
66 The subsequent sections follow my account of the patient trade affair in Andreas-Holger Maehle, ‘Doctors
in Court, Honour, and Professional Ethics: Two Scandals in Imperial Germany’, Gesnerus, 68 (2011),
61–79.
67 It was estimated that approximately 60,000–70,000 Russian patients per year travelled to Berlin for expert
medical advice and help. ‘Kleine Mittheilungen’, Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift, 27 (1901), 420. The
Russian Institute reported to have had 357 patients during the ﬁrst four months of its existence (May to August
1901); see Semjon Lipliawsky, ‘Das russische Institut f¨ ur medizinische Consultationen zu Berlin und seine
Th¨ atigkeit in den ersten vier Monaten seines Bestehens’, Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift, 27 (1901),
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appeals in the Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz – ie. the ofﬁcial newsletter of the Berlin
medical chamber and journal of the local medical professional societies – the deputy
chairman of the Medical Society of Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg, Julius Friedemann (b. 1858),
called for information on such practices, ‘in the interest of the professional dignity
[Standesw urde] of the German and especially the Berlin medical profession’.68 Clearly,
the intention was to initiate disciplinary proceedings against consultants who made
underhand payments to middlemen for bringing them private patients. Moll, as chairman
of the so-called Committee of Fifteen [F unfzehner-Ausschu], a group representing the
interests of the medical profession in the area of Berlin,69 soon sided with Friedemann
in this campaign and himself collected ‘material’ on this matter, which he partly shared
with Friedemann. The explosive nature of the issue became quickly apparent as Ernst
von Leyden (1832–1910), the doyen of internal medicine and former director of the First
Medical Clinic of the Charit´ e-Hospital of Berlin University, had agreed to be a consultant
for a planned outpatient clinic of the Russian Institute for Medical Consultations. After
Friedemann and Moll had personally spoken with him, von Leyden publicly retracted
from this agreement.70
Soon, however, another prominent clinician, Karl Anton Ewald (1845–1915), director
of the department for internal medicine at the Augusta-Hospital in Berlin and professor
at Berlin University, came under suspicion of being involved in the ‘patient trade’. Such
a suspicion was all the more delicate because Ewald was, at the time, a candidate in the
elections for the council of the prestigious Berlin Medical Society [Berliner Medizinische
Gesellschaft]. As in the case of von Leyden, private conversations took place. On behalf
of Ewald, Hermann Senator (1834–1911), the chairman of the Berlin Medical Society
and director of the Third Medical Clinic and Outpatient Clinic of the Charit´ e-Hospital,
followed Moll’s invitation to speak with him and Friedemann about the matter at Moll’s
home. As Senator later claimed, Moll and Friedemann ‘tricked’ him on this occasion
to implicate himself in the dubious practices surrounding Russian private patients. The
contents of the conversation became public in a libel trial in May 1909, after Senator had
been mentioned, in an article in the newspaper Berliner Zeitung am Mittag in March 1909,
as one of those making payments to the Russian Institute for sending patients to them.71
68 ‘Tagesgeschichtliches: Verein der Sch¨ oneberger Aerzte E.V.’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 13 (1908), 180;
see also, ibid., 192, 212. ‘Institute f¨ ur medizinische Konsultationen’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 13 (1908),
213–5; ‘Weiteres ¨ uber Institute f¨ ur medizinische Konsultationen’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 14 (1909),
10–12. The fact that the initiative against the Russian Institute for Medical Consultations and Dr Lipliawsky was
published in the Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz may have had to do with a serious business conﬂict between the
journal’s publishers, Haussmann and Hartmann, and Lipliawsky, who was a co-owner of the journal. Allegedly,
in a business meeting in October 1908, Lipliawsky had been physically assaulted and seriously injured by
Haussmann and Hartmann; see Hans Lungwitz, ‘Zu den medizinischen Wirren’, Therapeutische Rundschau,
3 (1909), 257–62, 289–92, 337–41, 353–6, 369–74, 424–5, 472: 354–5.
69 In the interest of Berlin’s medical practitioners, the Committee of Fifteen (founded in 1905) had, in October
1907, renegotiated an agreement with Berlin University’s surgical outpatient clinic that cases that could not
be used for teaching or research purposes should not be treated beyond the ﬁrst consultation and be directed
back to the practitioners. The Committee had thus previously been concerned with consultant–practitioner
relations. See ‘Mitteilungen des F¨ unfzehner-Ausschusses betreffend die staatlichen Polikliniken’, Zeitschrift f ur
 arztliche Fortbildung, 4 (1907), 671. The initial main concern of the Committee was the contractual relations of
practitioners with the health insurance organisations. See Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 181–2.
70 ‘Tagesgeschichtliches: Poliklinik f¨ ur Russen’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 13 (1908), 184.
71 ‘Patientenfang: Professoren als Provisionsgeber’, Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, 22 March 1909, 1. The same
newspaper had reported the allegations before without giving the names of the professors concerned: ‘Die Jagd
nach Patienten: Die Praktiken der Konsultationsbureaus’, Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, 18 December 1908, 1;
‘Verhandlung in der Privatklage des Geheimen Medizinalrats Professors Dr Senator gegen den verantwortlichen232 Andreas-Holger Maehle
As Moll later declared as a witness in disciplinary proceedings against Ewald, he also had,
in early January 1909, a private conversation about the issue with the latter.72
Before the trial of Senator against the editor of the newspaper, however, further
revelations about the patient trade and the Russian Institute had been made in a libel
trial of Moll against Dr Albert Levin (b. 1867), a member of the Medical Society of
Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg, in March 1909. Levin belonged to the society’s committee that had
taken on the investigation of this matter. When Levin asked Moll to give him access to
all his collected material on the patient trade issue, Moll refused. Incensed about this
lack of collaboration, Levin wrote a letter to Moll, in which he accused him of cowardice
or of holding back the material for improper reasons, or of actually having no further
material at all. Moll reacted with a libel action against Levin. Initially, Moll had taken
the view that one should deal discreetly with the patient trade issue, in order to stop
abuses but not to expose individual colleagues. However, by the time of the trial against
Levin his tactics had clearly changed. Moll now used the trial to make the conduct of the
Berlin university professors public, and Friedemann became his ally in this enterprise. In
his witness statement, Friedemann reported that von Leyden, Senator, and the urologist
Carl Posner (1854–1928), who was an extraordinary professor at Berlin University, had
admitted to having offered or made payments to middlemen from the Russian Institute
for Medical Consultations or other agents that had brought them private patients. He also
mentioned Ewald’s name in this connection. The judge, keen to limit proceedings to the
speciﬁc issue of libel, concluded that the payments described had actually happened, that
MollhadmadematerialonthismatteravailabletoFriedemann,andthatthetoneofLevin’s
letter to Moll was libellous. Levin was convicted, with a thirty Mark ﬁne.73
Both Levin and Moll subsequently appealed against this verdict. The appeal
proceedings, held in late May 1909, shortly after the libel trial of Senator against the
editor of the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag – in which Moll appeared as a witness – provided
a further forum to divulge details. This time, Moll’s lawyer submitted an extensive motion
to take evidence, in which he gave further details about the Berlin medical professors’
relationships with the Russian Institute. Dr Weissbein, as one of the Russian Institute’s
directors, had a defensive letter read out at the trial, in which he suggested that Moll
and Levin had stage-managed the whole libel case to obtain a public platform for their
accusations against the professors and the Institute. Moll and Levin energetically protested
against this insinuation. The trial ended with a settlement: Levin acknowledged that
Moll had had honourable reasons not to release his substantial material, withdrew the
accusations that he had made against Moll in his letter, and took on the costs for the trial.
Moll accepted and withdrew his libel action.74
Redakteur der “B. Z. am Mittag” Dr Fritz Auer vor der 147. Abteilung des Amtsgerichts Berlin-Mitte
(Sch¨ offengericht)’, 11 May 1909, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. IV, Nr. 46, adh B, fol. 101–201.
The trial ended with a settlement.
72 Ibid., fol. 91r–92v, fol. 234r (statements by Moll on 10 May 1909 and 7 June 1909).
73 ‘¨ Offentliche Sitzung des K¨ oniglichen Sch¨ offengerichts. Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg. Abt. 20. Privatklagesache des
Sanit¨ atsrats Dr Albert Moll (...) gegen den prakt. Arzt Dr Albert Levin’, 20 March 1909, ibid., fol. 13r–14v;
[Urteil], 20 March 1909, ibid., fol. 15r–18r; ‘Der Prozess betr. die russischen Konsultationsbureaus’, Berliner
 Arzte-Correspondenz, 14 (1909), 67–8.
74 ‘Zwei Beleidigungsprozesse betr. die Russischen Konsultationsbureaus’, Berliner  Arzte-Correspondenz, 14
(1909),113–16;‘Tagesgeschichte.VermittlungrussischerKonsultationen’,Zeitschriftf ur  arztlicheFortbildung,6
(1909), 399–400. On the social relevance of libel actions and their relationship to notions of honour in this period,
see Ann Goldberg, Honor, Politics, and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871{1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).God's Ethicist 233
The details of the trials were not only reported and commented upon in the medical
press,suchastheBerliner  Arzte-CorrespondenzandtheBerlinerKlinischeWochenschrift,
but also in newspapers across the political spectrum.75 The allegations that prominent
members of the Berlin medical establishment had paid ‘bribes’ to get private patients
provided the right sort of material for a public scandal. As in the Neisser case a few years
earlier, anti-Semitic comments were made. Obviously being aware that Moll, Friedemann,
Levin and Senator, as well as Lipliawsky and Weissbein, had a Jewish background, the
Deutsche Tageszeitung and Das Reich emphasised that Jewish doctors were prominently
involved in the affair.76
When the matter was also mentioned in the Lower House of the Prussian Parliament
[Abgeordnetenhaus], the Ministry for Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs
promised to investigate the allegations. At their own request, disciplinary proceedings
were started against the professors Ewald, Senator and Posner.77 Weissbein and
Friedemann initiated court of honour proceedings against themselves in order to have
their conduct vindicated.78 In the disciplinary proceedings against the three professors,
Moll was heard four times as a witness by the university judge and government ofﬁcial,
GeheimerRegierungsrat (SeniorExecutiveOfﬁcer)DrDaude.TheMinisterforReligious,
Educational and Medical Affairs, to whom reports on the hearings were sent, asked Daude
to obtain more detailed evidence from Moll because the latter initially refused to conﬁrm
that the accused professors had paid the middlemen speciﬁcally for bringing patients.
Only after Daude threatened legal action against Moll himself if he refused to give full
evidence did Moll provide further details that incriminated Ewald and Posner.79 In the
end, however, none of the involved professors was found guilty. While it was noted that the
medical professors concerned had occasionally given money to agents who had brought
them patients, the Ministry accepted their justiﬁcation that these payments had just been
small tips or small rewards for having acted as interpreters, or for having assisted when the
Russian patients were seen and examined by the professors. The disciplinary proceedings
against Senator and Ewald were abandoned in November 1909, as were proceedings
against the elderly and ill von Leyden which had been initiated only in the previous
month.80 Posner, who had regularly paid one speciﬁc agent, the Russian interpreter and
75 See, for example, Hans Kohn, ‘Russische Konsultationen’, Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift, 46 (1909),
623–4, 955–6, 1050–1; ‘Die russischen Konsultationen vor Gericht’, Medizinische Reform, 17 (1909), 133–5;
‘Die russischen Konsultationen: Die Rechtfertigung Senators’, Medizinische Reform, 17 (1909), 231–8;
‘Die Russischen Konsultationen: Die Berufungsverhandlung Moll gegen Levin’, Medizinische Reform, 17
(1909), 257–9; ‘Vermittlung russischer Konsultationen’, Zeitschrift f ur  arztliche Fortbildung, 6 (1909), 238–9.
‘Patientenfang: Schmiergelder von Berliner Aerzten’, Berliner Tageblatt, 21 March 1909; ‘Russische Institute
f¨ ur medizinische Konsultationen und angebliche Schmiergelder von Professoren und anderen Aerzten’,
Vossische Zeitung, 21 March 1909, 12. Beilage; ‘Patientenschacher vor Gericht’, Die Post, 21 March 1909;
‘Krankenschacher’, T agliche Rundschau, 21 March 1909, 2; ‘Aerztliche Schmiergelder’, Berliner Tageblatt,
22 March 1909; ‘Patientenschacher’, Der Montag. Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 22 March 1909, 1; ‘Patientenfang:
Professoren als Provisionsgeber’, Berliner Abendpost, 23 March 1909, 1.
76 ‘Patientenhandel’, Deutsche Tageszeitung, 22 March 1909; ‘Schmiergelder’, Das Reich, 23 March 1909, 1;
‘Kleine Pfeile’, Das Reich, 9 April 1909, 1.
77 Stenographische Berichte  uber die Verhandlungen des Preuischen Hauses der Abgeordneten, 21.
Legislaturperiode, II. Session 1908/09, Vol. 4, cols 5553–4, cols 5625–6 (sessions on 30 April and 1 May 1909).
78 GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. IV, Nr. 46, adh A, fol. 152r–153v; ibid., fol. 154r–155r, 233r–236r;
adh B, fol. 239–246. Both court of honour trials ended with an acquittal.
79 GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. IV, adh B, Disziplinaruntersuchungsakten gegen Ewald und
Genossen, fol. 91r–94v, 202r–203r, 211r, 233r–235r.
80 GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt, 2, Tit. IV, adh A, Acta betr. den angeblichen Patientenhandel durch ¨ Arzte
und Professoren an der hiesigen Universit¨ at, fol. 275r–277v, 280r–282r.234 Andreas-Holger Maehle
health assistant Bernhard Rosenberg (born c.1860) had to face a full trial by the Royal
Disciplinary Court for Civil Servants in January 1910, but was acquitted.81
With his intervention in this issue of professional conduct Moll had further established
himself as an ‘expert’ in medical ethics, but clearly at a reputational cost. While his
name was now all over the newspapers, and he had turned himself into a champion of
the economic interests of Berlin’s medical practitioners, his relationship to university
medicine had suffered further damage; for example, in the widely reported libel trial
of Senator against the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, Senator sneeringly called Moll and
Friedemann ‘... those two gentlemen, who make their appearance as guardians of medical
ethics and of collegiality’.82 The young doctor and medical journalist Hans Lungwitz
(1881–1967), who had recently completed his medical training in Ewald’s department,
published a series of polemical articles about the affair in his weekly Therapeutische
Rundschau, in which he ridiculed Moll as ‘God’s ethicist’ [Ethiker von Gottes Gnaden]
and as a ‘medical Sherlock Holmes’ who had ‘interrogated’ the professors in his ﬂat.
Lungwitz also shared Weissbein’s suspicion that the Moll vs Levin libel case had been
staged by these two in order to go public with their allegations. As Lungwitz claimed,
Moll’s and Friedemann’s campaign against the Berlin professors had damaged the
international reputation of German medicine and was ‘anti-German’ [deutschfeindlich].83
The latter remark may well have been understood by informed readers as an anti-Semitic
gesture towards the Jewish descent of both Friedemann and Moll.
Inprinciple,Mollhadrepeatedhisstrategytointerveneinanethicalissue,butthentotry
to protect his reputation and that of the profession by withholding incriminating material
until ‘forced’ to release it to the authorities; but, as in the issue of human experimentation,
such manoeuvring put him in an unfavourable light. Being called a ‘guardian of medical
ethics’ [W achterdermedizinischenEthik] by his medical peers was rather derogatory, and,
apparently, after the patient trade affair, Moll’s continuing membership as a representative
in the Berlin medical chamber was called into question by some of his colleagues.84
Conclusions
From my analysis of Moll’s medical ethics, there appears to be a discrepancy between
the appreciation that they might deserve from a present-day, ethical point of view, and
the historical impact they actually made. Theoretically, Moll’s move in his Medical
Ethics to privilege the doctor–patient relationship over issues of professional behaviour
among doctors themselves was important. His focus on the ‘contract relationship’ between
doctors and patients gave space to the self-determination of the patient, though he
moderated patients’ wishes with what he thought to be in the patient’s best interest. Moll
81 Ibid., fol. 306r–326v.
82 GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. IV, adh B, fol. 147 (‘...die beiden Herren, die als W¨ achter der
medizinischen Ethik und der Kollegialit¨ at auftreten’).
83 Lungwitz, op. cit. (note 68), 260, 337, 369–70, 472. Reports on the Berlin patient trade affair appeared in,
among others, the British Medical Journal, issues 2519 (10 April 1909) and 2526 (29 May 1909) and the
Southern California Practitioner, 24 (1909), 303. On Lungwitz’s biography and work, see Anika Fellermeyer,
‘Der Arzt Hans Lungwitz (1881–1967) im Spiegel seiner sozialreformerischen Schriften’ (unpublished MD
thesis: Universit¨ at W¨ urzburg, 2004); Matthias Miener, ‘Hans Lungwitz (1881–1967) – Arzt und Schriftsteller’
(unpublished MD thesis: Universit¨ at W¨ urzburg, 2005).
84 Lungwitz, ibid., 338. Moll had been elected into the medical chamber in December 1908 and chaired its
‘Vertragskommission’, which dealt with the contracts with health insurance organisations, from 1909 to 1918.
GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, VIII B, Nr. 825, fol. 366r–370v, fol. 402v; Nr. 827 (¨ Arztekammer f¨ ur die Provinz
Brandenburg und den Stadtkreis Berlin, July 1916–December 1920), 1005–21.God's Ethicist 235
canthusbeseen,tosomeextent,asapioneeroftheconceptofpatientautonomyinmedical
ethics. Carefully discussing conﬂicts of interest in many areas of medicine, his voluminous
text on medical ethics was the most elaborate consideration of the topic at this time.85
His contemporaries, however, do not seem to have picked up his point about respect
for patients’ wishes. A friendly but bland review in the M unchener Medizinische
Wochenschrift by the Hamburg gynaecologist Karl Jaff´ e (1854–1917) asserted that Moll’s
book was ‘a true reﬂection of the current views on medical ethics’ and praised his
‘impartial and objective point of view’. Incoming as well as experienced doctors might
learn from it, suggested Jaff´ e, but he also expressed his general doubts about the practical
usefulness of writings on medical ethics.86 A similar point was made by the reviewer
for the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, the Berlin physician Leopold Henius, who
thought that it was more helpful to seek the advice of an experienced colleague in doubtful
cases than to plough through a voluminous handbook. Many things in Moll’s book were
not new, claimed Henius, and other parts, such as that on the perforation of the fetus, ‘too
sophisticated to be convincing’. Both Jaff´ e and Henius acknowledged Moll’s enormous
industriousness in writing Medical Ethics, and, like Jaff´ e, Henius acknowledged Moll’s
‘calm, noble and objective tone’.87 But in the end, Henius’ assessment must have been
frustrating for Moll: ‘On the whole (...) we have here an industrious work which deserves
recognition, and we wish it a large readership, but, for the above-mentioned reasons, we do
not expect that it will have it’.88 Some reviewers in less prominent medical journals more
warmly recommended Moll’s book to their readership.89 Generally appreciative were also
the reviews in the Viennese medical periodicals.90 However, Henius’ prediction seems to
have been correct if one considers that there was no further German edition of Moll’s
Medical Ethics.
The reception of the book in the legal profession was perhaps more positive; for
example, Melchior Stenglein (1825–1903), formerly an ofﬁcial at the German Supreme
Court, praised, in a review in the legal journal Der Gerichtssaal, the similarity of Moll’s
views to current legal opinion on the issues of euthanasia and consent to surgery.91
Likewise, the Berlin lawyer Erich Sello (1852–1912), a friend of Moll’s, emphasised,
in his review, the many links to legal questions that the book provided.92 In fact, legal
publications on aspects of medical practice, such as consent and conﬁdentiality, regularly
85 See also Maehle, op. cit. (note 3), 110–18.
86 Jaff´ e, op. cit. (note 15).
87 Henius, op. cit. (note 15); similarly also Kaminer, op. cit. (note 15), who praised Moll’s objectivity and
impartiality.
88 Henius, ibid., 529: ‘Im ganzen und grossen (...) liegt eine ﬂeissige, anerkennenswerthe Arbeit vor, f¨ ur die wir
einen zahlreichen Leserkreis w¨ unschen, aber aus den oben angef¨ uhrten Gr¨ unden nicht erwarten’. In his memoirs
Moll called Henius a narrow-minded but inﬂuential member of professional societies (‘ebenso beschr¨ ankten wie
einﬂußreichen Standesvereinlers’); Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 265.
89 Marcell Lauterbach, ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Klinisch-therapeutischeWochenschrift, 9 (1902), 881–6;
[Ludwig] Kleinw¨ achter, ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik: Die Privilegien [sic!] des Arztes in allen Beziehungen
seiner Th¨ atigkeit’, Der Frauenarzt, 17 (1902), 9; Th. Toeplitz, ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Schlesische
Aerzte-Korrespondenz, 6 (1903), 187; anon., ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, New Yorker Medicinische
Monatsschrift, A. Ripperger (ed.), 14 (1902), 14–18.
90 H.A., ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Wiener Medicinische Wochenschrift, 52 (1902), 2106–7; Adolf Klein,
‘AlbertMoll,AerztlicheEthik’,WienerKlinischeWochenschrift,15(1902),453;[Max]Neuburger,‘AlbertMoll,
Aerztliche Ethik’, Wiener klinische Rundschau, 17 (1903), 642–3.
91 Melchior Stenglein, ‘Albert Moll, Aerztliche Ethik’, Der Gerichtssaal, 60 (1902), 383–4.
92 Erich Sello, ‘Aerztliche Ethik’, Die Zukunft, 38 (1902), 397–402. Moll mentioned the positive reviews by
Sello and Stenglein in his memoirs; see Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 272.236 Andreas-Holger Maehle
cited Moll’s work on ethics while often ignoring other medical literature.93 It would be
an exaggeration, however, to say that Moll’s Medical Ethics was a success, despite its two
translations into Russian. The editor of the 1904 translation, the Marxist medical doctor
and writer Vikentii Veresaev (1867–1945), characterised Moll as ‘a cautious, moderate,
and prudent philistine, who is devoid of noble purpose’ and saw parts of the book as
illustrating ‘the bourgeois outlook of the modern, ordinary German physician’. Russian
reviewers of Medical Ethics criticised it for its lack of a foundation in a philosophical
system and for its application of the term ‘ethics’ to problems of medical deontology.94
Moll himself, in his memoirs of 1936, repeatedly claimed that his outrage about abuses
in experimentation on hospital patients had made him feel compelled to write Medical
Ethics.95 In view of his later active engagement in medical politics, as a member of the
Berlin medical chamber from December 1908, one may also assume that a more general
interest in questions of professional conduct had been a motivating factor. His emphasis on
self-determination of the patient might have been a reﬂection of the speciﬁc circumstances
of his own practice, in which he saw private patients who paid for the consultations
themselves.
Only in the 1980s and 1990s, when medical ethics and bioethics became increasingly
important subjects in German academia, did historians of medicine engage with the
contents of Moll’s book on medical ethics. Susanne Hahn pointed to the focus on ‘situation
ethics’ in Moll’s text, and to his subjective response to the rise of science in medicine, as
exempliﬁed by the issue of human experimentation.96 Julius Henri Schultz, in a short
monograph on Moll’s medical ethics in 1986, emphasised the latter’s closeness to legal
thought and philosophical positivism; and for Antonia Eben, in her medical doctoral
dissertation of 1998, the ‘inductive’ and casuistic approach of Moll to ethical problems
was important – an approach that she linked with his liberal, Jewish–Christian thinking.97
Moll’s practical interventions in contemporary issues of medical ethics had no lasting
impact. His collected materials on human experimentation and his criticism of the Prussian
ministerial directive of 1900 did not lead to revisions of the regulations, as he had hoped.
His activities in the patient trade affair also failed to effect disciplinary punishment for the
professors involved. On the other hand, the publicity that his interventions in this matter
gained may well have put a temporary stop to the practice of clinicians’ payments to
middlemen. However, a hundred years on, when in August and September 2009 a new
patient trade affair went through the German media,98 nobody remembered that Berlin
had experienced all this before – let alone that Moll had been a ‘guardian of medical
ethics’ in this affair.
93 On the medico-legal debate of these issues, including Moll’s contributions, see Maehle, op. cit. (note 3),
47–94.
94 Lichterman and Yarovinsky, op. cit. (note 16), 443.
95 Moll, op. cit. (note 9), 261, 263.
96 Susanne Hahn, ‘Die ¨ arztliche Ethik im Leben eines Arztes der Seele – ¨ Uberlegungen zur medizinisch-
ethischen Konzeption Albert Molls (1862–1939)’, Zeitschrift f ur die gesamte innnere Medizin, 39 (1984),
558–61.
97 Schultz, op. cit. (note 14), 97–9; Eben, op. cit. (note 14), 124–5.
98 In the 2009 affair, medical practitioners had received bonus payments from speciﬁc hospitals for referring
patients to them; see, for example, Andreas Mihm, ‘Immer mehr ¨ Arzte “verkaufen” ihre Patienten’, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 August 2009; Anne-Kathrin Bonsert and Wolfgang Gehrmann, ‘Der Kopfgeld-Erreger:
¨ Arzte kassieren von Kliniken Fangpr¨ amien f¨ ur Patienten: Das System l¨ adt dazu ein’, Die Zeit, 10 September
2009. For a comparison of this recent scandal with the Berlin patient trade affair of 1908/9, see Andreas-Holger
Maehle, “‘Patient Trade” in Germany: An Ethical Issue at the Practitioner-Clinician Interface in 1909 and 2009’,
Medical Humanities, 36 (2010), 84–7.